Time | to 01:00 pm Add to Calendar 2024-10-10 12:00:00 2024-10-10 13:00:00 The Center for Social Data Analytics Colloquium Speaker: Sergio Montero B001 Sparks (the databasement) Population Research Institute America/New_York public |
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Location | B001 Sparks (the databasement) |
Presenter(s) | Sergio Montero, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Economics at the University of Rochester |
Description |
Center for Social Data Analytics will be hosting Sergio Montero, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Economics at the University of Rochester. His talk will be held on Thursday, October 10, 12:00- 1:00 pm in B001 Sparks (the databasement). His talk is titled: "Are Women Better Politicians? Discrimination, Gender Quotas, and Electoral Accountability?". Bio: Sergio Montero is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and (by courtesy) Economics at the University of Rochester. Prof. Montero's research straddles political economy, comparative politics, and political methodology. Broadly, he seeks to understand how strategic behavior by political elites shapes the performance and stability of democratic institutions. Methodologically, his work primarily relies on structural estimation, which blends formal theory and empirical analysis. His research has been published in leading political science and economics journals, including the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, and American Economic Review. He teaches courses on the political economy of public policy and quantitative research methods. Abstract: Gender quotas have been instrumental in addressing the political underrepresentation of women, and there is growing evidence that politician gender may significantly affect public policy. Yet the sources of these gender differences have not been examined from an electoral accountability perspective, nor has the role of having a quota system in place. Using novel data on constituent evaluations of municipal councilors in Mumbai, India—where reserved-seat gender quotas are assigned by lottery—we develop and estimate an accountability model in which male incumbents face probabilistic term limits. We find that female councilors significantly outperform their male counterparts, but reserved-seat quotas have countervailing selection and discipline effects. Due to taste-based discrimination by voters, counterfactual experiments reveal that gender quotas are indispensable to ensure women are not politically underrepresented. However, the latter can be achieved while improving voter welfare by mitigating the perverse incentives of term limits.
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